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LEAK PROSECUTIONS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: NEW
DEVELOPMENTS AND A CLOSER LOOK AT THE
FEASIBILITY OF PROTECTING LEAKERS

HEIDI KITROSSER*
ABSTRACT
This Article revisits the free speech protections that leakers are due
in light of recent commentaries and events. Among other things, the
Article critiques arguments to the effect that the Obama Administration’s uptick in leak prosecutions does not threaten the system of free
speech because plenty of classified information still makes its way
into newspapers and the absolute number of leaker prosecutions remains very low. Such positions overlook the slanted impact that
prosecutions and investigations are likely to have—and reportedly
have had—on the speech marketplace. The Article also explains that
even though the increase in prosecutions and other recent developments, including new government surveillance practices, heightens
existing strains on the marketplace of ideas, the developments themselves are not the source of those strains. The core source is a legal
framework in which the government is assumed to have a wide
leeway to prosecute leaks of classified information with only a very
minimal burden to show possible national security harm and no
obligation to assess the value of the information at stake. This
framework, particularly when combined with the classification
system’s dramatic overbreadth, leaves the door wide open for contenttargeted prosecutions and slanted chilling effects corresponding to
* Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. I am very grateful to the students of
the William & Mary Law Review for including me in a terrific symposium and for their
thoughtful edits to this Article. I also thank Mary-Rose Papandrea for being an excellent copanelist and a very valued sounding board on all things free speech and national security
related.
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administration-unfriendly views. Recent developments simply highlight and exacerbate these problems. The developments illuminate
the need for First Amendment standards that meaningfully define
and limit the subsets of classified information whose conveyance the
government can prosecute constitutionally. In past work, I have
proposed such standards. In this Article—building partly on the
facts of recent leak cases and partly on this Article’s own responses
to recent commentaries—I elaborate on those standards and their
potential applications.
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INTRODUCTION
The Obama Administration is walking a political and legal tightrope of late, committed to demonstrating both that it has the will
and the ability to stop leaks of national security information to the
press, and that it supports and protects national security journalism. This high-wire act was inspired, at least partly, by external
pressures. From the beginning, the administration faced skepticism
about its national security bona fides and pressure to stop national
security leaks.1 At the same time, the administration has prosecuted
more leakers of classified information than all previous administrations combined.2 Athough transparency advocates had already criticized the administration’s prosecution record, a far louder outcry
followed revelations that it had aggressively pursued journalists’
records in the course of investigating leaks.3 Most alarming to some
was the fact that the administration had referred to a journalist as
an alleged leaker’s criminal coconspirator in a warrant application
pertaining to a leak investigation, heightening concerns that the
administration might prosecute journalists for publishing stories
containing classified information.4 In the wake of the revelations
and ensuing outcry, the administration sought to assure journalists
that its commitment to stopping leakers is equaled by its belief in
a free press.5
Describing the balance that the administration strives to strike,
President Obama told an audience at the National Defense University on May 23, 2013, that “we must enforce consequences for those
who break the law and breach their commitment to protect classi1. Leonard Downie Jr., The Obama Administration and the Press, COMM. TO PROTECT
AM), https://cpj.org/reports/2013/10/obama-and-the-pressus-leaks-surveillance-post-911.php [http://perma.cc/WP6M-SK23].
2. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, A High-Tech War on Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at SR5;
Daniel Politi, Obama Has Charged More Under Espionage Act Than All Other Presidents
Combined, SLATE (June 22, 2013, 3:32 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2013/06/
22/edward_snowden_is_eighth_person_obama_has_pursued_under_espionage_act.html
[http://perma.cc/C35-844E].
3. See infra Part III.A.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 118-19.
5. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense University (May
23, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/5793-EN3B.
JOURNALISTS (Oct. 10, 2013, 10:00
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fied information. But a free press is also essential for our democracy.... Journalists should not be at legal risk for doing their jobs.”6
Indeed, the administration indicated that it would not prosecute
Julian Assange of WikiLeaks because it believed that it “could not
do so without also prosecuting U.S. news organizations and journalists” who published the classified information.7
The notion that it is both legally sound and logically desirable to
accord few, if any, protections to those who leak classified information to the press, while providing the press broad protections for
publishing such information, is not a new one.8 To the contrary, a
number of commentators have adopted this “mixed approach” over
the years. Indeed, the mixed approach can fairly be described as the
mainstream position on classified information leaks and publications, both because of its number of prominent adherents and
because it strikes a middle ground between alternatives.9 Furthermore, although the case law leaves room for argument in different
directions, it is fair to say that it most closely approximates the
mixed approach.10
6. Id.
7. Sari Horowitz, Julian Assange Unlikely to Face U.S. Charges over Publishing
Classified Documents, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/julian-assange-unlikely-to-face-us-charges-over-publishing-classifieddocuments/2013/11/25/dd27decc-55f1-11e3-8304-caf30787c0a9_story.html [http://perma.cc/
BUM8-WSXH].
8. See infra Part II.B (discussing the mixed approach).
9. See infra Part II.B; see also Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of
State: Calibrating First Amendment Protections for Leakers of Classified Information, 6 J.
NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 409, 418-19 (2013); David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the
Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV.
512, 515-17 (2013) (referring to the mixed approach as “the source/distributor divide” and
noting some of its prominent adherents).
10. See infra Part I.B for a discussion of the case law as it relates to leaker prosecutions.
As I explain there, the case law provides substantial support for the view that leakers are
largely unprotected under the First Amendment. I also note, however, that the case law is not
entirely one-sided and offers some support for speaker protective arguments as well. See
Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 419-21, 429-38. As for press protections, although the case law is
not definitive on that front either, it provides strong bases to support the notion that the press
is substantially protected when it publishes classified information. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone,
WikiLeaks and the First Amendment, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 477, 486-89 (2012) (discussing
relevant case law). For examples of legal scholars deeming the case law to reflect the mixed
approach, see Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: WikiLeaks and the Battle over the
Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311, 363-65 (2011)
(interpreting the case law largely to reflect the mixed approach but noting some uncertainty
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In discussing the mixed approach and its alternatives, it is
important to be clear on the relationship between constitutional and
nonconstitutional arguments. For example, although the Obama
Administration indicates that it will not prosecute journalists for
publishing classified information, it has not stated that it lacks a
legal right to do so. Indeed, some of the administration’s arguments
in litigation to prosecute leakers suggest that its constitutional
power to punish classified information’s conveyance is broad enough
to cover press publications.11 Others propose statutory protections
for leakers that extend beyond the First Amendment rights that
they believe leakers possess.12
This Article discusses classified information leaks insofar as they
relate to the Constitution, particularly to the First Amendment. In
discussing the mixed approach, for example, the Article refers predominantly to the constitutional version of the approach—that is,
to the notion that the press deserves strong First Amendment protections whereas leakers warrant few, if any, of the same. Nonetheless, as this Article’s analysis reflects, matters of policy and practice
are hardly irrelevant to the First Amendment questions at issue.
For one thing, given the First Amendment’s relative lack of textual
or historical guidance, speech and press clause inquiries necessarily
entail consideration of the theories and purposes underlying the
clauses and how best to implement them through standards or
apply them to particular facts. Furthermore, analyses of administrative practices and their effects—whether or not those practices are
motivated by constitutional reasoning—can be very informative as
to the practical impacts of particular legal standards on the speech
marketplace. Such information, in turn, is relevant to questions of
how best to achieve constitutional goals.

as to journalists’ protections where their efforts to obtain classified information go beyond
passively receiving it); Pozen, supra note 9, at 515-16; and Stone, supra, at 483-89.
11. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
12. Compare Benkler, supra note 10, at 363 (“There is little doubt that the government
has the power to prosecute its own employees, particularly those whose employment relates
to national security and who have access to classified information by dint of their public
employment, for revealing classified materials.”), with Yochai Benkler, A Public Accountability Defense for National Security Leakers and Whistleblowers, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
281, 285-86 (2014) (supporting a public accountability defense for leakers).
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Whether its expressed commitment to a mixed approach is
motivated by constitutional or policy concerns or both, developments
in the Obama Administration provide important occasion to revisit
the question of the First Amendment protections due to leakers. The
administration’s unparalleled numerical record of prosecuting cases,
combined with new technological surveillance tools and the administration’s known uses of the same, offer a new vantage point from
which to consider the impact of leak prosecutions on the speech
marketplace, and to assess the practice of the mixed approach in
particular. More so, these developments have sparked important
new commentaries by other observers.
This Article builds on my own earlier analyses in light of recent
events and commentaries. Elsewhere, I have argued that the principles and purposes underlying the First Amendment and the
separation of powers demand a level of skepticism toward classification decisions, and a valuing of information about government, that
can only be reflected in meaningful constitutional protections for
leakers.13 This is particularly so in light of the unique constitutional
roles of executive branch employees and contractors.14 Government
insiders have a relationship of trust with the government that
outsiders lack.15 Yet insiders also are uniquely positioned to learn
very valuable information that may wrongly be kept from the public
and that can only come to light through insider interventions.16
Some degree of substantive judicial oversight of leak prosecutions,
rather than near-total deference to executive classification judgments, is thus constitutionally necessary. These views are, as I have
explained, also bolstered by the history of the classification system,
including the fact that the system has been characterized by
rampant overclassification and misuse.17
The instant Article expands on these points. Among other things,
the Article critiques recent arguments to the effect that leak crackdowns do not threaten the system of free speech because plenty of
classified information still makes its way into newspapers and the
13. See Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 U. ILL. L.
REV. 881, 884-86; Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 411-13.
14. See Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 426-27.
15. Id. at 424.
16. Id. at 424-26.
17. Id. at 421-29.
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absolute number of leaker prosecutions remains very low. Such
positions overlook the slanted impact—both directly and indirectly
through chilling effects—that prosecutions and investigations are
likely to have on the speech marketplace. In other words, even if the
total quantity of classified information in newspapers remains
unchanged, a strong risk exists that its substantive content will
shift, on balance, to that which is more politically palatable to
administrations.
And although recent developments—including the numerical increase in leak prosecutions and new government surveillance and
investigative practices—may heighten the likelihood and extent of
these effects on the marketplace of ideas, the core problem is not the
developments themselves. Rather, the problem, at its deepest root,
is a legal framework in which the government is assumed to have
a wide leeway to prosecute leaks of classified information with only
a minimal burden to show possible national security harm and no
obligation to assess the value of the information at stake. This
framework, particularly when combined with the classification
system’s dramatic overbreadth and the longstanding practice of
tacitly authorizing leaks from the top of the executive branch, leaves
the door wide open for content-targeted prosecutions, or at minimum for slanted chilling effects corresponding with administrationfriendly viewpoints or subject matters. New developments simply
highlight these fundamental problems. They also illustrate the need
for First Amendment standards that define and limit, in some
meaningful way, the subsets of classified information whose conveyance can be prosecuted constitutionally. Relatedly, this Article
expands on the nature and feasibility of such standards.
Part I of this Article charts out the existing statutory and doctrinal landscape for leaker prosecutions. It explains that the existing
statutory scheme grants near-total discretion to the executive
branch to prosecute leaks of classified information. Although the
relevant judicial precedent is more mixed, it provides support for the
conventional wisdom that leakers are almost entirely unprotected
as a constitutional matter. Part II provides intellectual context for
assessing the most recent debates and developments concerning
leaker prosecutions. Specifically, it summarizes the three major
categories of scholarly argument regarding the constitutionality of
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leak prosecutions. First, the “executive discretion” approach
supports broad government powers to punish not only leakers, but
the press and other third-party publishers of classified information.
Second, the mixed approach combines a broad executive discretion
to prosecute leakers with substantial First Amendment protections
for the press. The third category, the “speaker protective” approach,
on the other hand, accords both leakers and publishers substantial
First Amendment protections. The speaker protective approach
consists largely of arguments that I have made in previous writings
on the topic. Part II’s iteration of the approach also incorporates
more recent work by other scholars.
Part III turns to recent developments relating to leaker prosecutions. It provides an overview of major developments, including the
rise of leak prosecutions in the Obama Administration, new government surveillance practices, new technologies available to leakers,
and journalists’ reports on their sources’ reactions to Obama
Administration practices. Part III.A cites arguments by commentators to the effect that these new developments, on balance, threaten
free speech and information flow. Part III.B cites arguments by
mixed approach and executive discretion proponents to the effect
that such free speech concerns are overblown. These commentators
suggest that the executive branch is simply attempting to right a
balance that technology and a growing disrespect for confidentiality
rules have tilted heavily against national security secrecy.
Part IV argues that new developments heighten the risks posed
by the existing legal framework to free speech and information flow.
More importantly, these changes highlight the dangers intrinsic in
a system that gives the executive branch virtual legal carte blanche
to prosecute leakers of classified information. Part IV also elaborates on legal standards that might properly reconcile leaker protections with national security and with legitimate executive personnel
control needs.
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I. THE STATUTORY AND DOCTRINAL LANDSCAPE
A. Statutory Avenues to Prosecute Leakers
Despite the common assumption that it is categorically illegal to
leak or publish classified information, the United States has never
had an official secrets act that creates such blanket illegality.18
Prosecutors instead must turn to somewhat more qualified statutory
provisions. The law most heavily relied upon, given the relative
breadth of its provisions, is the Espionage Act.19 Sections (d) and (e)
of the Act prohibit willfully disseminating, “to any person not
entitled to receive it”:
any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model,
instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense,
or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the
injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign
nation.20

Section (d) applies to anyone with lawful access to the information.21
The section also bars such persons from “willfully retain[ing] the
same and fail[ing] to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee
of the United States entitled to receive it.”22 Section (e) applies to
persons with unauthorized access to the information.23 It also prohibits them from “willfully retain[ing] the same and fail[ing] to
deliver it to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to
receive it.”24
18. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act: The Statutory
Framework and the Freedom of the Press, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 219, 219 (2007).
19. See Jessica Lutkenhaus, Note, Prosecuting Leakers the Easy Way: 18 U.S.C. § 1641,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1169 (2014) (“The espionage statutes ... have received the vast
majority of the attention surrounding leak prosecutions.”).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 793(d), (e) (2012).
21. Id. § 793(d).
22. Id.
23. Id. § 793(e).
24. Id.; see also United States v. Kim, 808 F. Supp. 2d 44, 52 (D.D.C. 2011) (indicating
that retention clauses might apply only to tangible items).
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Courts have read the “not entitled to receive it” language in light
of the classification system. In other words, they interpret the
statute to mean that those persons who are authorized, under the
classification system—which is largely a product of executive order
and related regulatory actions—to receive classified information are
entitled to receive it under the terms of the statute.25 Conversely,
those not authorized to receive such information under the classification system are not entitled to receive it within the statute’s
terms.26
Given the breadth and malleability of the remaining statutory
requirements, the bare fact that information is classified typically
will be enough to bring it within the statute’s protections. The
requirement that information “relat[es] to the national defense” is
quite expansive on its face. And courts consistently “construe[ ] [it]
broadly to include information dealing with military matters and
more generally with matters relating to United States foreign policy
and intelligence capabilities.”27 Although courts have imposed two
additional limits on the phrase, both track the statute’s other
textual requirements. The two limits are that information must be
“closely held by the government”28 and must “be potentially damaging to the United States or useful to an enemy of the United
States.”29 The first requirement largely maps onto the statute’s notentitled-to-receive element, particularly insofar as the element
gains content through reference to the classification system. The
second requirement tracks the textual requirement that the information’s “possessor has reason to believe” that it “could be used to
the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign
nation.”30
A government insider thus could, theoretically, face Espionage
Act prosecution for passing virtually any classified information to
a third party, including a journalist.31 A number of other statutes,
25. See Kim, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 54-55.
26. See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1075 (4th Cir. 1988); see also Kim, 808
F. Supp. 2d at 54-55.
27. United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 619-20 (E.D. Va. 2006).
28. Id. at 620-21.
29. Id. at 621-22.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 793(d), (e) (2012).
31. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The Espionage Act and National Security Whistleblowing
After Garcetti, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1531, 1534 (2008) (noting that given the Act’s breadth, “it
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too, have been or could be used to prosecute leakers.32 For those
concerned with this statutory terrain, one obvious path is to seek
statutory changes. Indeed, some important statutory proposals have
been raised.33 Realistically, however, given the current statutory
framework and the unlikelihood of near-term dramatic changes, the
question of First Amendment protections—that is, the extent to
which the First Amendment limits the government’s ability to
prosecute persons who leak classified information—is particularly
crucial.
B. Judicial Precedent and Leaky Government Insiders
There is but a single federal appellate court case on the constitutional protections from prosecution owed to leakers. That case,
United States v. Morison, upheld Samuel Morison’s conviction for
leaking classified satellite photos to the press.34 In his opinion for
the court, Judge Russell characterized Morison’s actions as pure
theft, deeming no “First Amendment rights ... implicated” by his
prosecution.35 Two of the three panel judges did, however, concur
separately to make clear their view that the prosecution implicated
the First Amendment.36 “[W]hile both concurring judges embraced
a deferential role for the judiciary,”37 they provided little detail as
to the level of deference that they would demand.38
Although the Supreme Court itself has yet to decide a leak
prosecution case, it has considered leakers’ rights in the context of
a contractual dispute. In the 1980 case of Snepp v. United States,
the Court upheld a contract in which former CIA agent Frank Snepp
had agreed to submit any writings about the CIA to the agency for
appears that there can never be a ‘legal’ public disclosure of classified national security
information under the Espionage Act”).
32. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 12, at 293, 315; Lutkenhaus, supra note 19, at 1168-72;
Vladeck, supra note 18, at 228-31.
33. See, e.g., The Espionage Act: A Look Back and a Look Forward: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Terrorism and Homeland Sec. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
12-14 (2010) (written testimony of Stephen I. Vladeck, Professor of Law, American University
Washington College of Law); Benkler, supra note 12, at 302-11.
34. United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988).
35. Id. at 1068-70.
36. Id. at 1080-81 (Wilkinson, J., concurring); id. at 1085-86 (Phillips, J., concurring).
37. Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 430.
38. For a more detailed discussion of the concurring opinions, see id. at 430-31.
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prepublication review.39 The Court also approved a constructive
trust against proceeds garnered by Snepp for writings not submitted
for review. The Court emphasized Snepp’s contractual agreement,
the fact that the agreement was designed to protect classified
information from disclosure, and the tight fit between Snepp’s
“fiduciary and contractual” breaches and the constructive trust
remedy that the Court approved.40 The Snepp Court barely addressed the First Amendment questions raised, dispensing of them
in a single footnote.41
There are persuasive arguments against extending Snepp to the
context of leaker prosecutions or otherwise applying it beyond its
facts. The most obvious reason is the virtual absence of attention
paid by the Snepp Court to the First Amendment. Furthermore, the
Court relied heavily on the close fit between the constructive trust
remedy and Snepp’s contractual breach,42 making the case an inapt
vehicle for addressing criminal prosecutions. Finally, Snepp was rife
with procedural irregularities. In his petition for certiorari, Snepp
asked the Court to consider the constitutionality of the injunctive
and damages remedies upheld by the appellate court.43 The government responded with a conditional cross-petition, asking the Court,
if it granted Snepp’s certiorari petition, also to review the appellate
court’s rejection of the constructive trust remedy that the trial court
had approved.44 The Court’s per curiam opinion focused almost
exclusively on the issues raised by the government, leading the
dissent to argue that the Court had effectively denied Snepp’s petition for certiorari and thus lacked jurisdiction over issues raised in
the conditional cross-petition.45 Moreover, the Court decided the
case without benefit of merits briefs or oral argument.46
Another line of cases—those involving the free speech protections
due to government employees against termination or other
39. 444 U.S. 507, 513 n.8, 515-16 (1980) (per curiam).
40. Id. at 510-12, 515-16.
41. Id. at 509 n.3.
42. Id. at 515-16.
43. Id. at 524 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 524-25; see also Diane F. Orentlicher, Snepp v. United States: The CIA Secrecy
Agreement and the First Amendment, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 662, 665 n.23 (1981).
45. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 524-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term—Foreword: Freedom of Expression in
the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1980); Orentlicher, supra note 44, at 665 n.23.
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employment-based discipline—also are relevant. These cases
sometimes are referred to as the “Pickering” cases for the first case
in the series, Pickering v. Board of Education.47 In these cases, the
Supreme Court established that government employees sometimes
are protected from being fired or disciplined for speech on matters
of public concern. To determine whether an employee may be punished in a given case, courts must apply the “Pickering balance,”48
which balances “the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”49 In the 2006 case, Garcetti
v. Ceballos, the Court clarified that these protections do not apply
to speech “made pursuant to the employee’s official duties.”50 Most
recently, in the 2014 case of Lane v. Franks, the Court made clear
that speech does not fall within the Garcetti exception simply
because it conveys information that an employee learned in the
course of their employment.51
There are potential implications, both positive and negative, for
leakers from the Pickering cases. On the one hand, the cases suggest
that the government has much greater leeway over the speech of its
employees than over ordinary citizens. Furthermore, some have
looked at the balancing test in particular and deemed it quite
clearly to favor the government’s right to control classified information leaks by its employees or contractors, with possible exceptions
for leaks that expose government illegality. On the other hand, the
Court in the Pickering cases “acknowledge[d] the importance of
promoting the public’s interest in receiving the well-informed views
of government employees engaging in civic discussion.”52 Indeed, the
Court emphasized in Lane that its “precedents dating back to
Pickering have recognized that speech by public employees on
subject matter related to their employment holds special value

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

391 U.S. 563 (1986).
Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983).
Id. at 140 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568).
547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006); see also id. at 418-423.
134 S. Ct. 2369, 2378-80 (2014).
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419.
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precisely because those employees gain knowledge of matters of
public concern through their employment.”53
Finally, it bears noting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, in the 2007 case of Boehner v. McDermott, stated that “those
who accept positions of trust involving a duty not to disclose
information they lawfully acquire while performing their responsibilities have no First Amendment right to disclose that information.”54 In United States v. Kim, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia cited this statement in denying Stephen Kim’s
motion to dismiss his indictment for allegedly leaking classified
information to the press.55 The Boehner court’s statement, and the
Kim court’s reliance on the same, are subject to two precedent-based
objections. First, the courts are mistaken in deeming the statement
to follow from the Supreme Court case of Aguilar v. United States.56
The Aguilar Court upheld a federal judge’s conviction for revealing
a wiretap order to its subject.57 Citing Snepp, the Aguilar Court
explained that “[a]s to one who voluntarily assumed a duty of confidentiality, governmental restrictions on disclosure are not subject
to the same stringent standards that would apply to efforts to
impose restrictions on unwilling members of the public.”58 This
statement tells us only that the voluntary commitment element is
a factor that lowers the level of constitutional protection relative to
what it otherwise would be. It does not mean that First Amendment
protections fail to apply at all. Indeed, the Aguilar Court stressed
that the relevant statute targeted only disclosures of wiretap orders
or applications intended to impede the same.59 The Court also cited
the obvious state interests in preventing this narrow set of disclosures.60 Second, the Boehner Court’s sweeping statement is belied
by a wealth of Supreme Court case law, including Lane v. Franks
and the earlier Pickering cases, which made clear that “public
employees do not renounce their citizenship when they accept
employment, and this Court has cautioned time and again that
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379.
484 F.3d 573, 579 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
808 F. Supp. 2d 44, 56-57 (D.D.C. 2007).
See Boehner, 484 F.3d at 579; Kim, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 57.
United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 595, 609 (1995).
Id. at 606.
Id. at 602.
Id. at 605-06.
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public employers may not condition employment on the relinquishment of constitutional rights.”61
On balance, then, there is ample support for the conventional
wisdom that judicial precedent supports broad executive discretion
to prosecute leakers. This is particularly so in light of Morison and
the absence of any other federal appellate court cases to the
contrary. That said, commentators are too quick to assume that the
case law is nothing but bad news for leakers. Snepp, for one, is
readily distinguishable from leak prosecution cases. And there are
persuasive arguments that the government employment cases not
only are distinguishable from prosecution cases, but also include
points that can be marshalled to support leaker protections.
II. THE CORE POSITIONS IN DEBATES OVER LEAKER PROTECTIONS
Before describing the major scholarly positions on leaker
protections, a word of clarification is in order. Typically, leaker
protections are discussed at least partly in relation to the protections due to third-party publishers who publish leaks, particularly
members of the press. For example, part of the rationale of mixed
approach proponents is that the impact of low leaker protections on
the marketplace of ideas is counterbalanced by the high protections
accorded to the press.62 In my own work on speaker protections in
this Article and elsewhere, I explain that leakers’ special constitutional role demands that they receive protections that are robust but
not as extensive as those due to members of the press.63
Thus, although this Article’s focus is on leaker protections, the
Article also refers to press protections when it is useful. In summarizing the major scholarly approaches to leaker protections, then,
this Part also discusses, to the extent useful for context and clarity,
the vision that each approach manifests toward third-party publisher protections.

61. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2377 (2014).
62. See infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
63. See infra Part V.C.
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A. The Executive Discretion Approach
Members of the executive discretion camp would accord the
executive very broad discretion to punish not only insiders who leak
classified information to which they gained access through their
insider status, but also members of the press or other third-party
publishers who publish the information. The position effectively
entails the view that those who leak or publish classified information deserve little, if any, protection under the First Amendment.
In litigation to prosecute leakers—and in one case initiated
during the George W. Bush Administration to prosecute third-party
speakers—administrations consistently articulate the most extreme
version of the executive discretion position, which is that classified
information is not speech at all. Rather, classified information is
government property and its conveyance is theft.64 A slight variant
on the argument is that even if classified information is speech, it
is speech integral to committing a crime in light of statutes that
forbid the unauthorized conveyance of national defense information.
Its conveyance—whether by leak or by third-party publication—thus deserves no protection under the First Amendment.65
Some scholars offer a considerably more sophisticated version of
the executive discretion position. They acknowledge that executive
discretion is no panacea, but deem it the best option among nonideal
alternatives.66 In a world of imperfect information and decision making, someone must have the final word, as a constitutional matter,
as to when information is too dangerous to disclose.67 That person
64. The George W. Bush Administration took this position in United States v. Rosen, the
only prosecution in history directed against third parties—specifically, lobbyists—rather than
government insiders for disseminating classified information. See, e.g., Government’s
Supplemental Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Superseding Indictment at 22,
29-30, United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006) (No. 1:05CR225)
[hereinafter Government’s Response]. The Obama Administration has made very similar
arguments in the context of prosecuting leakers. See Consolidated Response of the United
States to the Defendant’s Pretrial Motions at 33-34, United States v. Kim, 808 F. Supp. 2d 44
(D.D.C. 2011) (No. 10-225 (CKK)) [hereinafter Consolidated Response].
65. See Government’s Response, supra note 64, at 27-28; Consolidated Response, supra
note 64, at 30-31.
66. See RAHUL SAGAR, SECRETS AND LEAKS: THE DILEMMA OF STATE SECRECY 125-26
(2013).
67. See GABRIEL SCHOENFELD, NECESSARY SECRETS: NATIONAL SECURITY, THE MEDIA, AND
THE RULE OF LAW 64-65 (2010).
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is the President, whether acting directly or through subordinates
with classification authority.68 Those taking this view ground it in
the President’s relative expertise and democratic legitimacy.69 They
also deem this position consistent with the Constitution.70
In keeping with the relative nuance of some executive discretion
commentary, executive discretion proponents do not deny the fact
of overclassification. To the contrary, they acknowledge and lament
it. Nonetheless, they maintain that executive discretion is the only
viable approach to unauthorized disclosures and that overclassification must be dealt with separately. For example, Rahul Sagar discusses the problem of overclassification and acknowledges executive
discretion’s costs to the free flow of information.71 He even takes the
view that classified information disclosures are morally justified in
limited circumstances.72 Still, Sagar opposes protecting such disclosures legally. Speaking of press protections, he reasons:
If we allow private actors to ignore classification markings, then
we ought to ask ourselves why we have established a classification system in the first place. The point is not that officials do
not engage in overclassification. Rather, it is that if we do not
want private actors to undermine the public authority that we
have created through law and armed with expertise and
information, then we must accept, warts and all, the decisions
produced by a classification system designed, authorized, and
funded by publicly elected officials. Conversely, to the extent the
prevailing system is flawed, the appropriate remedy must be
public reform directed by our chosen representatives, not
subversion by under-informed private actors.73

68. Id.
69. Espionage Act and the Legal Constitutional Issues Raised by WikiLeaks: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 52-53, 56-57, 59-65 (2010) (written
testimony of Gabriel Schoenfeld, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C.; Resident
Scholar, Witherspoon Institute, Princeton, N.J.); SAGAR, supra note 66, at 13, 109-26;
SCHOENFELD, supra note 67, at 64-65, 187-91, 204.
70. SAGAR, supra note 66, at 16-30; SCHOENFELD, supra note 67, at 64-65; John C.
Eastman, Listening to the Enemy: The President’s Power to Conduct Surveillance of Enemy
Communications During Time of War, 13 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 49, 57-58, 64-66 (2006).
71. SAGAR, supra note 66, at 111-16.
72. Id. at 126.
73. Id. at 113.
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Gabriel Schoenfeld similarly agrees that overclassification is a
substantial problem that the government must address, but that
constitutional leeway for publishers or for low-level leakers is
unwarranted.74 His views are well captured in his discussion of
Daniel Ellsberg’s leak of the Pentagon Papers. Schoenfeld acknowledges that in retrospect, it may be the case that “the release of the
information contained in the Pentagon Papers did not pose any sort
of tangible threat to American security.”75 He also criticizes the poor
judgment inherent in the Nixon Administration’s heavy-handed
responses to the leak.76 Still, Schoenfeld maintains that “at root
Ellsberg’s leak was an assault not only on orderly government but—
in a polity that has an elected president and elected representatives—an assault on democratic self-governance itself.”77 Ellsberg
had “taken the law into his own hands and was prepared to do so
again, which is precisely why he deserved to be stopped and punished.”78
B. The Mixed Approach
Adherents to the mixed approach strike a middle ground between
speaker protective and executive discretion approaches. They would
accord few, if any, First Amendment protections to insiders who
leak classified information but would strongly protect third-party
publishers, particularly members of the press, who publish the same
information.79
74. See Gabriel Schoenfeld, Secrecy, Leaks, and Selective Prosecution, HOOVER INST. 1, 5-9,
13-14 (Jan. 19, 2012), http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files /documents /Emerging
Threats_Schoenfeld.pdf [http://perma.cc/AAX5-GNDZ] (citing the problem of overclassification
and suggesting that the President or Congress authorize some high-level presidential appointees to pass on classified information, but making clear his continued support for executive
discretion to prosecute all leakers not given such allowances). Schoenfeld does note in passing
that “we also need better protection for genuine whistleblowers.” Id. at 13. Because he does
not elaborate, it is not clear if he would support statutes or regulations offering protection for
certain types of disclosures to the press or only for internal executive branch disclosures or
disclosures to Congress. Nor is it clear what disclosures he would deem “genuine”
whistleblowing. Still, this is a welcome statement and it is the reason that I refer in the text
to his opposing “constitutional” leeway rather than any type of “legal” leeway.
75. SCHOENFELD, supra note 67, at 186.
76. Id. at 186, 188.
77. Id. at 187.
78. Id. at 191.
79. See, e.g., Mary-Rose Papandrea, Leaker Traitor Whistleblower Spy: National Security
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Of the two major justifications for the approach, the first, or
waiver justification, is that government insiders who access classified information by virtue of their insider status have waived any
First Amendment rights to disseminate the same. The notion is that
the leaker has no right to share information that she accessed solely
by virtue of her position of trust with the government, a position at
least implicitly—and virtually always explicitly—conditioned on a
promise of nondisclosure.80 At the same time, mixed theory proponents believe that third parties not in relationships of trust with the
government owe no special duty of secrecy to the government. As
such, they are entitled to roughly the same free speech protections
for publishing classified information as for publishing unclassified
information.81
The second major justification is the “practical balance” rationale
to the effect that the mixed position best balances national security
secrecy needs with a free press. This rationale is frequently linked
to Alexander Bickel’s view that the First Amendment ordains an
“unruly contest between the press, whose office is freedom of
information and whose ambition is joined to that office, and government, whose need is often the privacy of decision making and whose
servants are ambitious to satisfy that need.”82 From this contest, or
Leaks and the First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 449, 451 & n.6 (2014) (describing this approach and citing a number of its adherents).
80. See, e.g., Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by WikiLeaks:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 5-8 (2010) [hereinafter Espionage
Act Hearing] (written testimony of Geoffrey R. Stone, Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service
Professor of Law, University of Chicago); William E. Lee, Deep Background: Journalists,
Sources, and the Perils of Leaking, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1453, 1461, 1473, 1487-89, 1529 (2008);
Keith Werhan, Rethinking Freedom of the Press After 9-11, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1561, 1597-98
(2008); see also Cass R. Sustein, Government Control of Information, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 889,
914, 916, 918-19 (1986) (describing waiver justification and closely related arguments that the
instant Article groups with waiver).
81. See, e.g., Espionage Act Hearing, supra note 80, at 9-10; Geoffrey R. Stone, Secrecy and
Self-Governance, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81, 92-93 (2011-2012); Werhan, supra note 80, at
1597-98.
82. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 87 (1975). In fact, as Cass Sunstein
pointed out nearly three decades ago, the question of leaker protections does not fit perfectly
into Bickel’s framework. Sunstein, supra note 80, at 912-13. It is not clear, after all, whether
leakers are a part of government’s “team” in the contest, or whether they are off the team by
virtue of having leaked. Id. Nonetheless, the contest metaphor, or the “disorderly situation,”
as Bickel also calls the combined phenomena of the government’s right to protect its secrets
and the press’s right to publish that which it manages to obtain, frequently is invoked to
describe the mixed approach. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, The Invisible Hand in Legal and
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“disorderly system,” emerges “the optimal assurance of both
[secrecy] and freedom of information.”83 Proponents of the mixed
approach do not insist that it results in some theoretical ideal.84
Like the more sophisticated versions of the executive discretion
approach, some iterations of the mixed approach frame it as a
realistic, if imperfect, way to confront the epistemic difficulties of
assessing and balancing the value and dangers of particular leaks
and publications. Whereas executive discretion proponents deem
deference to executive classifiers to be the best solution with respect
to both leaks and publications, advocates of the mixed approach
split the difference in light of the dangers and benefits of executive
control.
Geoffrey Stone nicely captures the practical balance rationale for
the mixed approach. He argues that when it comes to insider
leakers, we do and should “overprotect[ ] the government’s legitimate
interest in secrecy relative to the public’s legitimate interest in
learning about the activities of the government.”85 This allows for a
“clear and easily administrable rule for government employees.”86
And when it comes to third-party publishers, we do and should
“overprotect[ ] the right to publish, as compared to a case-by-case
balancing of costs and benefits.”87 Quoting Bickel, Stone concludes:
This is surely a “disorderly situation,” but it seems the best
possible solution. If we grant the government too much power to
punish those who disseminate information useful to public debate, then we risk too great a sacrifice of public deliberation. If
we grant the government too little power to control confidentiality at the source, then we risk too great a sacrifice of secrecy and
government efficiency. The solution is thus to attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable values of secrecy and accountability by
guaranteeing both a strong authority of the government to

Political Theory, 96 VA. L. REV. 1417, 1421 (2010) (describing Bickel’s contest metaphor and
“optimal” disclosure language as applying directly to the mixed approach); Note, Media
Incentives and National Security Secrets, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2228, 2228, 2233-34 (2009).
83. BICKEL, supra note 82, at 86.
84. Indeed, of the unruly contest more broadly, Bickel said: “like democracy, in Churchill’s
aphorism, it is the worst possible solution, except for all the other ones.” Id. at 87.
85. Stone, supra note 10, at 487 (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 488 (emphasis added).
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prohibit leaks and an expansive right of others to disseminate
them.88

C. The Speaker Protective Approach
Under a speaker protective approach, both leakers and publishers
warrant substantial First Amendment protections. This does not
mean that either should receive absolute protection. Nor does it
mean that each should receive the same level of protection as the
other. Nonetheless, each should receive significant protections under the First Amendment. Elsewhere, I make the case for this approach in some depth. This Subpart summarizes those arguments.
1. The Basic Constitutional Case
The case for speaker protectiveness begins with the notion that
to convey classified information is to speak within the First Amendment. Contrary to the position consistently taken by the executive
branch, including the current administration in litigating leak
prosecutions,89 such conveyance is not only speech, but is very high
value speech under the First Amendment. Indeed, although scholars
and Justices disagree in many respects over particulars of First
Amendment theory and doctrine, the one point of clear consensus is
that speech about government, its activities, and particularly speech
about possible government abuses, is at the very core of the First
Amendment and its underlying principles and purposes.90 This does
not tell us, of course, how we should weigh such speech’s value
against competing interests or who should conduct such weighing.
It does tell us, however, that more is needed under the First Amendment to justify punishing the conveyance of classified information
than simply to call it conduct rather than speech or otherwise to
deem it outside of the First Amendment.
If the core remaining question is who must decide whether to
punish such conveyance, the speaker protective position is that the
answer cannot, consistent with the Constitution, be that the executive has nearly unfettered discretion to make such decisions through
88. Id. at 489.
89. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
90. For detailed discussion and citations, see Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 421-22.
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its classification and prosecutorial powers. Even if one were to look
no further than the consensus that the First Amendment protects
speech that helps the people to oversee and check their governors,
nonprotective approaches are problematic. It is only logical that
government insiders sometimes are the only possible sources of such
speech. And although there are sound reasons against according
them an unfettered right to engage in such speech, there are equally
sound bases against according the executive an unchecked power to
dictate, via the classification stamp, what they may and may not
share. Indeed, such executive power conflicts directly with the wellestablished notion that free speech is a crucial counterweight to the
fallibility and potential abuses and mistakes of our governors.91
This same logic also militates strongly against deeming executive
branch employees or contractors—the only people in a position to
access certain information about government’s doings—to have fully
waived their First Amendment rights, even when they have signed
nondisclosure agreements. Their First Amendment rights are
grounded not only in their individual interests, but also in their
societal value as potential sources of information. Indeed, this is the
very concept underlying the Supreme Court’s recognition in the
Pickering line of cases that “the First Amendment interests at stake
extend beyond the individual speaker” as the public has an interest
“in receiving the well-informed views of government employees.”92
More pointedly, the same notion underscores the “well settled” position that “a State cannot condition public employment on a basis
that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in
freedom of expression.”93
When we move beyond free speech theory to the separation of
powers and government structure, the case for speaker protectiveness becomes stronger still. So many details of the constitutional
text—including but not limited to the fact of a single President, the
division of the appointments power between the President and the
Senate, Congress’s constitutional ability to delegate some inferior
officer appointments away from the President, the absence of
91. See id. at 422 & n.64.
92. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006).
93. Id. at 413 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983)). In a recent article,
Mary-Rose Papandrea thoroughly addresses and dismantles the waiver argument from additional perspectives, including that of contract law. Papandrea, supra note 79, at 520-24.
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specific constitutional constraints on much presidential power coupled with Congress’s expansive textual capacity to craft the law that
the President executes, and the provision of a limited textual secretkeeping capacity and limited privilege for Congress and its members
and the absence of either for the President—suggest a government
framework within which the President has energetic capacities,
including the capacity to keep secrets, but in which those capacities
are subject to external and internal checks to prevent their misuse.94
The textual indications are very much bolstered by history from
the framing and ratification period. For example, supporters of the
proposed Constitution insisted that the document’s Framers, in
declining to annex a council to the President, had deprived the
President of a group that would eagerly do his bidding and hide his
secrets. One supporter explained that “[t]he executive power is
better to be trusted when it has no screen.... [W]e have a responsibility in the person of our President; he cannot act improperly, and
hide either his negligence, or inattention; he cannot roll upon any
other person the weight of his criminality.”95 Alexander Hamilton
went further, boasting that the President not only would lack a
council behind which to hide, but that his appointed subordinates
would be unlikely to shield his bad acts.96 Appointees selected by the
President and a council, Hamilton reasoned, would “possess[ ] the
necessary insignificance and pliancy to render them the obsequious
instruments of [the President’s] pleasure.”97 This unhappy state of
affairs would far less likely follow, he predicted, from appointments
contingent on Senate approval.98
None of this is meant to suggest that the Constitution’s text and
its underlying history give us precise instructions as to how to treat
leakers and publishers of classified information. To the contrary, the
text leaves many questions unanswered, and there was much
disagreement and omission in early views on the parameters of
presidential power and secrecy. Yet history, text, and constitutional
94. For detailed discussion and citations, see HEIDI KITROSSER, RECLAIMING ACCOUNTA(2015).
95. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 495 (Merrill
Jensen ed., 1976).
96. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 373 (Alexander Hamilton) (Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008).
97. Id.
98. See id. at 373-74.
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structure do tell us a number of important things. First, neither the
Constitution’s original meaning nor its underlying principles demand that the President have legal secret keeping prerogatives.
More to the point, they plainly do not require an unfettered
executive ability to punish the conveyance of information that the
executive marks classified. Second, underlying constitutional principles and purposes—as evidenced both by constitutional structure
and history—suggest deep and widespread concerns over how best
to balance secrecy’s virtues against its potential abuses. Third, the
Constitution and its history also reflect a dual role for government
employees. This dual role parallels the broader constitutional goal
of reconciling government energy (including secrecy) with the risks
of its abuses. On the one hand, government employees are a part of
the executive branch and thus are responsible for contributing to its
energy and efficacy, including its secret-keeping efforts. On the
other hand, government employees are crucial safety valves for
protecting the people from abuse and incompetence, given their
unique access to information otherwise invisible to the public.
Although the Constitution does not hand us a precise roadmap for
handling leakers, it gives us much material with which to work.
Given their crucial constitutional role as uniquely informed
potential speakers, leakers must have robust First Amendment
protections. Yet given countervailing considerations—including
leakers’ other constitutional role as part of the executive branch
machinery—such protections should not be absolute or even nearly
absolute. More detailed thoughts on the precise doctrinal standards
that should apply are discussed in Part V. For now, it suffices to
note that constitutional text, structure, and history guide us toward
robust, albeit not unlimited protections, for leakers.
2. The Realities of the Classification System and the Relevance
of the Same to Leaker Protections
From a theoretical perspective, reasoning purely from constitutional text, structure, and history, it is deeply problematic to
empower the executive to strip First Amendment protections from
government insiders for conveying any information that the
executive stamps as classified. When one looks to the classification
system and its history, that conclusion is bolstered dramatically.
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Two aspects of the system and its history lend themselves to this
effect. First, as has long been widely acknowledged across the political spectrum, there is rampant overclassification.99 If theory and
logic counsel us against deferring fully to executive classification
decisions, so history confirms that classification is hardly conclusive
as to whether a particular piece of information is too dangerous to
convey. Second, it also has been long understood that administrations regularly and intentionally leak information from “the top.”
The ubiquitous practice of selective leaking enables administrations
to manipulate information flow more precisely than through
classification alone.100 Wide classification and prosecutorial powers,
combined with selective leaking, can chill those not clearly “on
message” from conveying wide swaths of information, while
emboldening others to convey selected portions of the same.
Elsewhere, I elaborate at length on the fact and effects of
overclassification and of selective leaks from the top. Rather than
repeat those discussions here, I simply reiterate that these phenomena are largely undisputed across the political and ideological spectrum.101 Mixed and executive discretion proponents themselves
acknowledge and even lament the phenomena. They simply disagree
with speaker protectionists on the implications for the legal protections due to leakers and publishers.
III. POST-9/11 DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE “UNRULY
CONTEST ”
A. New Developments and Arguments that These Developments
Strengthen the Government’s Hand
Over the past few years, commentators, myself included, have
pointed to what we deem game changers in the unruly contest—
developments that tilt the game too far in favor of the government.102 These developments include the Obama Administration’s
99. For detailed discussion and citations to this effect, see KITROSSER, supra note 94, at
62-64; and Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 426-29.
100. For detailed discussion and citations to this effect, see KITROSSER, supra note 94, at
63-64; and Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 428-29.
101. See KITROSSER, supra note 94; see also Kitrosser, supra note 9.
102. See, e.g., KITROSSER, supra note 94, at 107-12; Jack M. Balkin, Old School/New School
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unprecedented number of leak prosecutions and new technological
and legal tools that enable the government to track down leakers
more easily than in the past.103
The government’s new capacities are reflected in an exchange
that Lucy Dalglish, former executive director of the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, had with an intelligence
official at a conference.104 The official told her that a subpoena for
reporter James Risen—still being appealed as of this writing—“is
one of the last you’ll see.... We don’t need to ask you who you’re
talking to. We know.”105 The official surely was referring to the fact
that evidence of journalist-source contacts can be found through
phone and e-mail records, and through electronic indicia of travel
and in-person meetings. The Obama Administration has followed
such tracks in part through third-party subpoenas to communications, credit card, and bank companies.106 Matthew Miller, a former
spokesman for Attorney General Eric Holder, cited such tools as one
reason for the number of recent prosecutions.107 He explained that
“ ‘a number of cases popped up that were easier to prosecute’ with
‘electronic evidence’.... ‘Before, you needed to have the leaker admit
it, which doesn’t happen’ ... ‘or the reporter to testify about it, which
doesn’t happen.’ ”108 Indeed, the most old fashioned of journalistsource meet-ups are vulnerable to electronic discovery: “Even
meetings in dark parking garages à la Bob Woodward in All the
President’s Men are not safe if a camera captures footage of every
person that comes in and out.”109
Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2306-07, 2315, 2327-39 (2014); Benkler, supra
note 12, at 282-85, 304, 324-25; Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 439-40; David McCraw & Stephen
Gikow, The End to an Unspoken Bargain? National Security and Leaks in a Post-Pentagon
Papers World, 48 Harv. C.R.-C.L. 473, 492-95 (2013); Papandrea, supra note 79, at 450-52,
460-64.
103. See supra note 102.
104. Liptak, supra note 2, at SR5.
105. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. See, e.g., McCraw & Gikow, supra note 102, at 495; Papandrea, supra note 79, at 45960; Liptak, supra note 2, at SR5; Michael Isikoff, DOJ Gets Reporter’s Phone, Credit Card
Records, NBCNEWS (Feb. 25, 2011, 7:11 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/41787944/ns/us_
news-security/#.U8_-ImOiU4I [http://perma.cc/9NXX-WXAL]; see also Downie Jr., supra note
1, at 1-3, 9, 17-20.
107. Downie Jr., supra note 1, at 14.
108. Id. at 9.
109. Papandrea, supra note 79, at 460 & n.50 (citing Liptak, supra note 2, at SR5).
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Journalists report that these new realities, along with highprofile revelations of broader government surveillance activities,
particularly Edward Snowden’s explosive disclosures regarding
NSA’s surveillance capacities and activities, have chilled their communications with sources.110 Scott Shane of the New York Times
observes that “[m]ost people are deterred by those leak prosecutions.
They’re scared to death. There’s a gray zone between classified and
unclassified information, and most sources were in that gray zone.
Sources are now afraid to enter that gray zone. It’s having a deterrent effect.”111 Shane notes that some sources explicitly cite the
recent spate of leak prosecutions in “rebuffing a request for background information.”112 Washington Post reporter Rajiv Chandrasekaran echoes Shane’s reference to gray areas, explaining that “one
of the most pernicious effects is the chilling effect created across
government on matters that are less sensitive but certainly in the
public interest as a check on government and elected officials.”113
Two particularly striking revelations came to light in May 2013.
First, the Obama administration acknowledged that it had, in investigating a 2012 Associated Press (AP) story a few months earlier,
“secretly subpoenaed and seized all records for 20 AP telephone
lines and switchboards for April and May of 2012.”114 Although the
targeted story involved only five AP news reporters and an editor,
the seized records covered “ ‘thousands and thousands of newsgathering calls’ by more than 100 AP journalists using newsroom, home,
and mobile phones.”115 This event occurred despite four-decades-old
Department of Justice regulations substantially restricting the occasions and procedures whereby journalists or their communications
records can be subpoenaed.116 The regulations require, among other
things, that subpoenas be used only as “last resort[s]” in federal
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See, e.g., Downie Jr., supra note 1, at 1-4, 21-23.
Id. at 2.
Papandrea, supra note 79, at 462 & n.68.
Downie Jr., supra note 1, at 3.
Id. at 17.
Id.
The Department of Justice Guidelines on Subpoenas, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS (July 11, 2013), http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/digitaljournalists-legal-guide/department-justice-guidelines-subpoenas [http://perma.cc/GRG9-9Y64]
(explaining that the regulations have been in effect since 1970 with respect to subpoenas to
journalists and that they have been in effect since 1980 with respect to subpoenas issued to
telephone companies for journalists’ telephone records).
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investigations, that they be “ ‘as narrowly drawn as possible,’ [and]
that the targeted news organization[s] ‘be given reasonable and
timely notice’ to negotiate the subpoena[s] with Justice or to fight
[them] in court” except where such “negotiations would ‘pose a
substantial threat to the integrity of the investigation.’ ”117 Second,
three-year-old court records were unsealed, revealing that the
administration had, in 2010, secretly obtained a subpoena to access
journalist James Rosen’s telephone and e-mail records as part of a
leak investigation.118 To support its subpoena application, the
administration had stated via affidavit that Rosen himself had
probably violated the Espionage Act as “an aider, abettor, and/or coconspirator” in the leak.119
The 2013 AP subpoena “only came out because the Justice Department used a grand jury subpoena; according to its internal
rules, such a request must be made public within ninety days.”120 In
contrast, had the government “employed a national security letter
... the request for phone records would likely still be secret.”121 Jack
Balkin cites this distinction in contrasting what he calls “old school”
tools to police speech, such as subpoenas, with “new school” tools,
including national security letters (NSLs).122 Like third-party subpoenas, NSLs can be used to demand that entities, including bank,
credit card, or communications companies, turn over information
about their customers.123 What is special about NSLs is that “they
can be issued by executive officials without a judicial warrant or a
hearing,” and they “normally come with a gag order. The recipient
may not reveal the contents of the NSL or the fact that it exists, and
recipients are subject to the gag order until the government releases
them, which it may never do.”124 Balkin observes that “[t]ens of
thousands of NSLs are issued secretly every year, and those who
117. Downie Jr., supra note 1, at 18 (summarizing and quoting parts of 20 C.F.R. § 50.10).
118. Anne E. Marimow, A Rare Peek into a Justice Department Leak Probe, WASH. POST
(May 19, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/a-rare-peek-into-a-justice-departmentleak-probe/2013/05/19/0bc473de-be5e-11e2-97d4-a479289a31f 9_story.html [http://perma.cc/
3LK5-UEVH].
119. Id.
120. Balkin, supra note 102, at 2339.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2300.
123. See id. at 2332.
124. Id. at 2330-31.
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know the most about the practice and its consequences are forbidden to speak about it.”125 Balkin cites NSLs to exemplify the larger
phenomenon of “new school” tools to regulate speech. One hallmark
of new school regulatory tools is their cooption of private enterprises
to block the speech of, deliver information about, or otherwise
impact their clients or other private actors in accord with government wishes.126 Another hallmark of new school tools is that they
“emphasize[ ] ... low salience (or invisibility) rather than chilling
effects. Both the state and the owners of private infrastructure may
prefer that filtering, blocking, and surveilling be largely invisible to
the general public, so that their operations appear normal, unobtrusive, and inoffensive.”127
At first glance, journalistic and scholarly concerns over chilling
effect may seem to conflict with Balkin’s observation that new
school speech regulations are directed less at chilling and more at
encouraging “most people to chill out.”128 Yet the two phenomena
can and apparently do quite readily coexist. Such coexistence stems
from the fact that investigative tools are comprised of a mix of
“known knowns,” “known unknowns,” and “unknown unknowns.”
Known knowns include the fact of multiple prosecutions, hard-line
statements by the administration, and investigative tactics engaged
in openly or revealed after the fact. Known unknowns are exemplified by the fact that we know that thousands of NSL letters have
been issued, yet we may never learn to whom many of them are
directed. Unknown unknowns include the possible existence of other
surveillance techniques about which we do not know, but which
there is reasonable basis to guess exist in light of facts that have
surfaced over the years, like those revealed by Snowden.
B. The View that New Developments Do Not Strengthen, and May
Weaken, the Government’s Hand
The core response to concerns over heightened antileaker aggression is that they simply are overblown. A number of commentators
point out that although the percentage increase in leak prosecutions
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 2333 (footnote omitted).
See id. at 2332.
Id. at 2300.
Id. at 2300-01.

1252

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1221

in the Obama Administration has been dramatic, the raw number
of prosecutions remains quite small. For example, Jack Goldsmith
argues that “the number of prosecutions [in the Obama administration] has been very small, as has the overall effort, compared to the
overall number of leaks.”129 David Pozen also observes, without
drawing a definitive normative conclusion as to the legal protections
due to leakers, that “it is important to keep statistical as well as
historical perspective. Against a backdrop of ‘routine daily’ classified
information leaks, a suite of eight prosecutions looks more like a
special operation than a war.”130 And Gabriel Schoenfeld, writing in
2010 from an executive discretion perspective, challenged perceptions of prosecutorial overreach by citing the then-prevailing total
of three convictions in U.S. history.131 Schoenfeld protested that
“[t]hree successful prosecutions for leaking classified information
over the course of the last thirty years—indeed, three such cases in
total over the entire sweep of American history—does not exactly
constitute a reign of terror.”132
Commentators also suggest that if the uptick in prosecutions
signifies anything, it is the government’s tougher-than-ever task of
protecting necessary national security secrets. As Goldsmith puts it,
the Obama Administration’s prosecution record and investigative
tactics simply mark “an attempt—and almost certainly a losing
one—to restore the equilibrium that prevailed before 9/11.”133
Goldsmith argues that intragovernmental concerns about the
legality of certain controversial programs in the years since 9/11
have led to a spate of leaks.134 This trend is bolstered by perceptions
that the White House and top officials themselves share classified
information regularly with members of the press. Goldsmith
explains that “[w]idespread disrespect of the secrecy system at or
129. JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11
220 (2012).
130. Pozen, supra note 9, at 536.
131. SCHOENFELD, supra note 67, at 239.
132. Id.; see also, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, A Liberal Communitarian Approach to Security
Limitations on the Freedom of the Press, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1141, 1162 (2014)
(noting that the number of investigations is “a tiny fraction of all of the illegal leaks”).
133. Jack Goldsmith, Obama’s Crackdown on Leaks Won’t Stop Secrets from Coming Out,
NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115132/obamas-crack
down-leaks-wont-stop-secrets-coming-out [http://perma.cc/ZP28-N5RE].
134. Id.
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near the top of government emboldened the unusual number of
whistle-blowers further down who gave information to journalists
and others in the last decade because they thought the government
was doing something illegitimate.”135 Gabriel Schoenfeld similarly
deems the last decade or so a time of particularly egregious
leaking.136 He links the phenomenon at least partly to the ubiquity
of “upper-level leaking” and to consequent “disrespect for the
classification system and the rule of law throughout the government
and society at large.”137
Commentators add that leak prosecutions and investigative
tactics must be ramped up not only to address the bare fact of
increased leaks, but also to contend with new technologies that
make the gathering and disseminating of large, indiscriminate leaks
more feasible than ever. Jack Goldsmith reminds us that “[i]t took
Daniel Ellsberg months to copy and sneak out of RAND the seventhousand-page Pentagon Papers reports.”138 In contrast, “Chelsea
Manning and Edward Snowden downloaded much more information
much more quickly in a much smaller (and thus easier to hide)
format.”139 Goldsmith adds that “the secrets stolen by Manning and
Snowden were much harder for the government to control once out
because the Internet allowed their easy (and encrypted) global
dispersion.”140 He concludes that “the same technologies that have
empowered the government to know more about its employees and
their communications with journalists have also empowered the
employees and the journalists to disclose or discover more about
government secrets.”141 New technologies thus enhance the threat
posed by leaks even as they make it easier for government to track
down leakers and publishers. In using technology to serve its own
ends, the government seeks simply to right the balance between free
speech and national security, not to tip it unduly in its favor.

135.
136.
137.
138.

GOLDSMITH, supra note 129, at 71.
Schoenfeld, supra note 74, at 3.
Id.
Goldsmith, supra note 133; see also DANIEL ELLSBERG, SECRETS: A MEMOIR OF
VIETNAM AND THE PENTAGON PAPERS 290-91, 295, 299-302 (2002) (describing the agonizingly
slow and perilous process of copying the Pentagon Papers).
139. Goldsmith, supra note 133.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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Some commentators point to the Obama Administration’s response to the May 2013 subpoena revelations as evidence that
cultural norms and pressures in favor of free speech are alive and
well, and keep the balance of forces tilted well in favor of leakers
and publishers.142 In the wake of the May 2013 revelations, President Obama reiterated his commitment to stopping leakers, but
added that “a free press is also essential for our democracy. That’s
who we are. And I’m troubled by the possibility that leak investigations may chill the investigative journalism that holds government accountable.”143 The White House directed the Department of
Justice to review its guidelines for investigations, culminating in
revised policies that were announced in July 2013.144 The revised
guidelines “significantly narrow the circumstances under which
journalists’ records could be obtained.”145 For example, they establish a presumption in favor of notifying journalists in advance
“whenever Department attorneys seek access to their records
related to newsgathering activities.”146 The report announcing the
guidelines also affirms that the Department will not subject “members of the news media ... to prosecution based solely on newsgathering activities.”147 The new guidelines also state that the work
materials of a “member of the news media” may not be searched
unless that member “is the focus of a criminal investigation for
conduct not connected to ordinary newsgathering activities.”148 Jack
Goldsmith points to the revised guidelines as one of several pieces
of evidence demonstrating that “while it is fashionable to say and
think that press freedoms are under siege, the opposite is true—at
least when it comes to national security reporting.”149 Amiti Etzioni
similarly argues that “the press has never been stopped by the
142. See Etzioni, supra note 132, at 1171-72; Goldsmith, supra note 133.
143. Remarks by the President, supra note 5.
144. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON REVIEW OF NEWS MEDIA POLICIES (2013),
available at http://perma.cc/T6VM-X9GY.
145. Charlie Savage, Holder Tightens Rules on Getting U.S. Data, N.Y. TIMES, July 13,
2013, at A1.
146. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 144, at 2.
147. Id. at 1. The Report deems this simply a restatement of extant Department policy.
148. Id. at 3.
149. Jack Goldsmith, Extraordinary U.S. Press Freedom to Report Classified Information,
LAWFARE (Dec. 2, 2013, 8:05 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/12/extraordinary-u-spress-freedom-to-report-classified-information/ [http://perma.cc/QW5C-WLDR].
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government even though the law allows for such action. Norms and
politics are the media’s strongest shield as it wields its sword.”150
Finally, commentators argue that the proof of the pudding—that
free speech and a free press are not endangered—is in the fact that
classified information leaks remain ubiquitious. Etzioni observes
that “[e]ven amid Obama’s ‘war on leaks,’ the press has regularly
carried reports based on insider and classified information—
including top-secret documents—and there is very little indication
that their government sources have been scared into silence.”151
Goldsmith makes the same point in criticizing a fall 2013 report by
the Committee to Protect Journalists that deems the press at risk.152
He writes that “[o]ne of the inadvertently funniest aspects of [the]
report is [the] serial quotations from prominent journalists who
regularly report about highly classified information yet who complain ... about how hard it is to get secrets.”153
IV. THE ONGOING NEED TO CURTAIL EXECUTIVE DISCRETION TO
PROSECUTE LEAKERS
Commentaries dismissive of the free speech concerns raised by
recent leak prosecutions highlight the national security exceptionalism that underlies both mixed and executive discretion approaches.
These commentaries embrace a level of government control over
speech that would be unthinkable outside of the national security
realm. Certainly, the national security setting poses very real challenges with respect to questions of judicial expertise and capacity.
Yet it is all too easy to fall prey to what I call “exceptionalism
creep”: that is, the special difficulties posed by aspects of a particular topic can lead those addressing the topic to treat other aspects
of it, too, in an exceptional manner. With respect to leaks, the national security factor may call for exceptional approaches to
assessing harm and to determining who, as among the judiciary, the
executive branch, or the legislature, can be trusted to make such an
assessment. This is not to say that exceptional approaches are called
for, and that question is dealt with in Part V. It is only to say that
150.
151.
152.
153.

Etzioni, supra note 132, at 1172.
Id. at 1161 (footnote omitted).
Goldsmith, supra note 133.
Id.
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it is fair, even important, ground to consider. Yet the national
security factor does not necessarily impact the free speech value of
particular leaks, and it certainly does not automatically lessen the
value of leaks as a group.
Yet the notion that leaks are exceptional with respect to their free
speech value is implicit in arguments that free speech is unharmed
by leak prosecutions because classified leaks remain plentiful and
because the absolute number of prosecutions is low. The idea that
a quantity reduction of a particular type of speech content—in this
case, speech conveying classified information—is unproblematic so
long as a large amount of it remains is anathema to First Amendment theory and doctrine.154 Much more importantly, whatever the
aggregate amount of classified information conveyed, a wide executive discretion to prosecute leaks seriously threatens to impact the
substantive content of that aggregation. The notion that particular
speech penalties and threats of the same may manipulate the content of the speech marketplace—particularly with respect to speech
about government—would normally be viewed as a cause for
tremendous alarm from the perspectives of free speech theory and
doctrine.155
To understand more concretely why a broad prosecutorial discretion threatens to manipulate the content of the speech marketplace,
recall the permissiveness of the Espionage Act. Although not an
official secrets act, the Act contains requirements that nonetheless
are broad enough that one could make a plausible case for applying
it to virtually any unauthorized disclosure of classified information.156 Indeed, one could make a good case for applying the Act to
much that is “sensitive but unclassified” because the Act does not
refer specifically to the classification system but rather to the fact
that the information was conveyed to someone “not entitled to
154. Indeed, in the campaign finance context, the notion that expenditure restrictions can
reduce the quantity of campaign speech has long been among the Supreme Court’s core
reasons for deeming such restrictions suspect. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434,
1444 (2013); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1976).
155. Among the cardinal principles in free speech doctrine is the notion that government
presumptively may not regulate speech on the basis of its content. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser,
From Marshall McLuhan to Anthropomorphic Cows: Communicative Manner and the First
Amendment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1339, 1339-42, 1345-49 (2002) (summarizing this rule and
citing relevant cases).
156. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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receive it.”157 Yet even focusing solely on the classification system,
that system’s astounding reach—with millions of classification
decisions made yearly158—makes the Act a sweeping prosecutorial
tool. In this respect, the fact of overclassification matters very much.
Given widespread, cross-ideological agreement with the view
expressed by former Solicitor General Griswold, who argued the
Pentagon Papers case on behalf of the Nixon Administration—that
“there is massive overclassification and that the principle concern
of the classifiers is not with national security, but rather with
government embarrassment”159—it is inevitable that much classified
information includes deeply valuable speech. In particular, it
includes speech instrumental in helping the people and the other
branches to oversee the executive. Indeed, it is not unusual for
congresspersons to complain that they learned of major, highly
controversial executive branch programs only after reading about
them in the newspapers.160 The Edward Snowden leaks mark a
particularly striking example of information generating rich and
vigorous debate and activity among the public, Congress, and the
executive branch, all with respect to government programs that
were largely unknown prior to the leaks.161
More important than the amount of valuable speech potentially
covered by the Act, given the low absolute number of prosecutions
to date, is the tremendous potential that the Act’s sweeping nature
creates for discriminatory decisions to investigate or prosecute
based on viewpoint or subject matter. Indeed, Yochai Benkler
observes that although there is “no robust evidence that the number
of national security leaks [overall] has increased in the past decade
or so,”162 what “does appear to have increased ... is the number of
157. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 2013 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 3-6 (2014),
available at http://perma.cc/94J3-EXX6 [hereinafter ISOO REPORT].
159. Erwin N. Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25; see
also KITROSSER, supra note 94.
160. See, e.g., Congress Gets More Info on NSA Spying from Newspapers than from
Classified NSA Briefings, WASHINGTON’S BLOG (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.washingtonsblog.
com/2013/10/congress-gets-more-info-on-nsa-spying-from-newspapers-than-from-classifiednsa-briefings.html [http://perma.cc/J82Y-SJSU].
161. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 12, at 300-02, 321-24.
162. Id. at 282-83. Benkler also questions the thesis that prosecutions have increased due
to the special risks of digitized leaking. He notes that “of the sixteen national security leak
and whistleblowing cases of the past decade, only two—Manning and Snowden—were
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national security leaks that purport to expose systemic abuse or a
systemic need for accountability.”163 Goldsmith, too, while perceiving
leaks to have increased overall, takes the view that the increase
stems partly from leakers’ concerns over the legitimacy of government actions and programs in the wake of 9/11.164 It is unsurprising
that ramped up leak investigations and prosecutions may be
sparked at least partly by a rise in “accountability leaks.”165 Of equal
importance, the wide and obvious potential for politically motivated
targeting threatens a substantial chilling effect, disproportionately
impacting accountability leakers.
Any actual and potential effects on the speech marketplace can
only be heightened by more aggressive prosecutorial and investigative practices, including those facilitated by new technologies.
Recall, for example, the observation that today’s investigative techniques constitute a mix of “known knowns” and “known unknowns,”
including ubiquitous, technologically sophisticated, and controversial methods, as well as reasonable bases to suspect the presence of
additional techniques or “unknown unknowns.” This potent cocktail
makes sense of journalists’ reports to the effect that their sources
increasingly are reticent to speak about national security matters.
Although journalists may be able to fill any quantitative gaps
caused by such chill, particular stories or pieces of information surely are lost or changed in the process.
The breadth of the classification system, combined with sweeping
prosecutorial discretion, thus poses a substantial threat to the free
flow of information about government. Commentators are absolutely
correct to call for large-scale reform of the classification system.
Such reforms have been called for since at least the 1950s,166 and
the current administration has taken some positive steps, including
decreasing the number of persons with “original” classification
authority.167 Nonetheless, there is little, if any, real disagreement on
facilitated by the Internet and computers.” Id. at 283.
163. Id.
164. GOLDSMITH, supra note 129, at 71.
165. Benkler uses the term “accountability leaks” to refer to “unauthorized national
security leaks and whistleblowing that challenge systemic practices.” Benkler, supra note 12,
at 282.
166. PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BD., TRANSFORMING THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM (2012), available at http://perma.cc/6H5B-AWLG.
167. ISOO REPORT, supra note 158, at 2.
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the point that the system remains, and for decades has been,
unwieldy and wildly overbroad in practice. More so, although it is
and always will be crucial to police the system, some potential for
abuse and poor judgment is intrinsic in any system that gives
human beings throughout government the power to deem pieces of
information too dangerous to be viewed by the public and even by
many within the government.
Classification status thus is, as a matter of fact—and inevitably
may be, as a matter of theory—a deeply imperfect proxy for the
dangers posed by particular pieces of information. Given this reality, efforts to reform the system are not enough. It also is necessary
to offer First Amendment guidelines that define and limit, in some
meaningful way, the subsets of closely held information whose
conveyance can constitutionally be prosecuted.
V. DOCTRINAL STANDARDS AND FEASIBILITY OBJECTIONS
A. Feasibility Objections to a Substantive Judicial Role
Before considering how courts may grapple with the doctrine and
facts of particular leak prosecutions, it is helpful to revisit and
elaborate on the major objections to granting courts a meaningful
role in overseeing such prosecutions. Some objections are grounded
in theoretical arguments to the effect that the executive has unique
democratic and constitutional legitimacy to control the classification
system, including by prosecuting leakers.168 These concerns are
addressed in this Article’s arguments as to how leaker protections
fit within the constitutional framework.
Beyond constitutional and democratic-legitimacy-based concerns,
the most ubiquitous objection is that courts lack the expertise or
information meaningfully to oversee classification decisions and
leak prosecutions. The strongest form of this objection contrasts the
judiciary’s lack of aptitude with the executive branch’s relative
advantages. Executive discretion advocates in particular emphasize
that executive branch officers, especially those near the top of the
pecking order, have the knowledge and expertise to understand the

168. See supra text accompanying notes 66-70.
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big picture.169 This enables them to see, for example, when pieces of
information that may seem innocuous in isolation could be used by
terrorists to dangerous effect.170 Such broad spectrum vision stems
from experience with and exposure to information across different
national security contexts. Such information is not readily conveyed
to or processed by judges in case-by-case adjudication.171 Furthermore, even if such information could adequately be conveyed, exposing it in the course of litigation may itself cause harm.172 Indeed,
prosecutors may elect not to proceed with otherwise worthwhile
prosecutions due to potential exposures.173
A somewhat more moderate epistemic objection is that leak
classification and leak prosecution decisions do not lend themselves
to clearly right or wrong answers. Such decisions entail assessing
factors that are difficult, if not impossible, to balance against one
another. To the extent that classification and leak prosecutions are
judgment calls, having courts second guess them is at best of
dubious value, and at worst dangerous given courts’ relative epistemic disadvantages.174 From an executive discretion perspective,
this reasoning further bolsters the notion that all such questions
must be left to the executive. From a mixed approach perspective,
such difficulties are among the reasons to give the executive near
total discretion to prosecute leakers, while balancing out the risks
to free speech by according strong protections to the press.175

169. See supra Part II.A.
170. See supra Part II.A.
171. See SAGAR, supra note 66, at 66-67, 116, 119-25; cf. Schoenfeld, supra note 67, at 6-9
(suggesting that it might be wise policy to exempt high-level presidential appointees from
anti-leaking laws, as their position gives them democratic legitimacy and also “affords them
a broader view of the consequences of leaking information than a civil servant typically enjoys”).
172. See SAGAR, supra note 66, at 155.
173. Id. at 65-66, 155.
174. Id. at 119-25; Stone, supra note 10, at 481, 485. Sagar also frames this objection in
terms of legitimacy. That is, to the extent that the decisions at issue are political judgments,
they should be left to elected officials and their subordinates. See Sagar, supra note 66, at 6970. Yet this argument, like other legitimacy-based arguments, fails to account for the salutary
role of leakers in the constitutional and democratic order.
175. See Stone, supra note 10, at 481, 485, 487-88.
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B. General Reflections on Feasibility
Subparts C and D discuss doctrinal standards that courts should
create in the leaker protection context, and some guidelines that
courts might develop over time to help them apply the same. Before
turning to those points, two general reflections on expertise and
institutional capacity are warranted. First, although judicial review
is hardly a panacea, we must keep in mind to what we are comparing it. The executive, for all of its advantages, is not without serious
defects as an originator and guardian of national security secrets.
Its disadvantages include institutional likelihoods of self-serving
secrecy and groupthink. Indeed, groupthink not only is a wellknown product of institutional secrecy, but itself can foster unnecessary secrecy where group values and loyalties place a premium on
keeping information close.176 And the executive’s track record on
secrecy—those parts of it, of course, that are known—falls well short
of exemplary. The widely known problem of overclassification
already has been noted. Additionally, examples of secrets kept
through other means, such as the state secrets privilege, that were
eventually revealed to be unnecessary to protect national security
and intended instead to hide abuses or errors, are not difficult to
find.177 Nor is unnecessary secrecy costless to national security. As
Benkler puts it:
When a system whose insularity and secrecy disable external
criticism, combined with individual cognitive and group information dynamics that contribute to poor diagnosis of the state of
the world, substantial errors are inevitable. When this system
is as large and complex as the national security system, and
when the stakes of errors are so high, these dynamics reliably
lead to periodic tragedy, abuse, or both.178

Second, if it is easy to overstate the executive’s expertise, it is just
as easy to overstate the judiciary’s haplessness. For one thing,
176. See, e.g., SISELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 21016 (1982); ELLSBERG, supra note 138, at 237-38; Benkler, supra note 12, at 289-96.
177. Perhaps the most infamous example in this regard is United States v. Reynolds. 345
U.S. 1 (1952). The government’s representations in that case were found decades later to have
been utterly false. See KITROSSER, supra note 94, at 97 (discussing Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1).
178. Benkler, supra note 12, at 292.
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courts are in the business of taking complicated statutory schemes
and applying them to equally complicated facts in realms ranging
from the scientific to the financial. In common law and constitutional realms, courts routinely translate vague or abstract directives
into doctrinal rules and standards that they can feasibly apply to
unpredictable sets of facts. Furthermore, extant doctrinal standards
in a range of contexts commit courts to asking and answering
questions, including whether particular speech poses security
dangers,179 whether it concerns matters of public importance,180 and
whether its potential disruptiveness outweighs public and speaker
interests in sending and receiving the speech.181
Of course, the national security realm presents special challenges
insofar as the relevant facts typically involve secrets that one or
more parties argue cannot safely be revealed in open court. This is
no small challenge. Nonetheless, as David Pozen points out, it is a
challenge that can be overstated.182 Most notably, objections based
on judicial secrecy concerns tend to ignore or dismiss the Classified
Information Procedures Act (CIPA).183 CIPA was enacted in 1980 to
establish procedures enabling the safe use of classified information
or substitutes for the same in criminal trials, and “a number of
studies have extolled [its] track record in national security cases.”184
As Pozen writes, “[w]hatever CIPA’s drawbacks, its history and
design put the burden on those who would argue it is inadequate in
leak cases, an argument that has not been elaborated.”185
C. On Proposed First Amendment Standards and Doctrinal
Flexibility
Turning to the doctrinal standards that courts might formulate
for leak cases, then, it is useful to start by recalling leakers’ complex
179. In the context of allegedly “inciting” speech, for instance, the Supreme Court asks
whether speech is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action.” Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (citation
omitted).
180. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1968).
181. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
182. See generally Pozen, supra note 9.
183. Id. at 552-53.
184. Id. at 552.
185. Id. at 553.
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dual role in the constitutional order. On the one hand, insiders are
a part of the executive branch’s machinery. As such, they properly
are subject to executive control beyond that to which ordinary
persons or entities—including third-party publishers—are subject.186 At the same time, insiders’ constitutional significance is not
exhausted by their role as servants of the branch. They occupy
other, equally important positions in the constitutional structure—those of potential checks on abuses or mistakes to which they
alone may be privy.187
The constitutional balance between executive control and checks
on the executive calls for a nuanced calibration of protections and
permissible punishments for insider leakers. The calibration should
reflect two factors. First, it must be grounded partly in the relationship between the employee’s institutional role and the punishment
sought by the government. Second, it must reflect a considered balance between the constitutional value in deterring leaks and that in
avoiding overdeterrence of leaks.
Elsewhere, I have drawn a few conclusions from this calibration.
First, the Pickering balancing test is appropriate only where the
leaker is punished by the government in the latter’s role as employer, such as where the leaker is fired or demoted.188 A standard so
deferential to the government is not appropriate when imprisonment or monetary penalties are at stake, and when the government
would be exacting punishment not in its role as employer, but in its
role as sovereign.189 Second, courts should consider taking a cue
from defamation doctrine, with its fine-tuned standards based on
penalty severity, and develop standards that vary with the severity
186. Elsewhere I have suggested that third-party persons or entities who publish leaked
information should receive the full First Amendment protections that would apply were the
information not classified. See supra Part II.C. Concretely, this means that something akin
to the standard for assessing punishments of speech that threaten to incite violence—whereby
punishment is constitutionally permissible only if the speech is intended to, and is likely to,
incite imminent illegal activity—must apply. See Kitrosser, supra note 13, at 927-28. I say
“akin” to the incitement standard to acknowledge the possibility that slightly different
standards should apply to speech that incites violence through advocacy versus speech that
enables violence by disclosing information. Such variance may be appropriate in light of the
different mechanisms and different time frames through which the respective types of speech
may cause harm. Id.
187. See generally Kitrosser, supra note 9.
188. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
189. Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 441-42.
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of the criminal or civil punishments sought against leakers.190 Based
on these conclusions, I have suggested two standards in particular.
For prosecutions or civil actions seeking substantial sanctions, such
as several years in prison or very large monetary penalties, courts
might require the government to show that the leaker lacked an
objectively reasonable basis to believe that the public interest in
disclosure outweighed identifiable national security harms.191 For
actions seeking less severe sanctions, courts might require the
government to demonstrate that the leaker lacked an objectively
substantial basis to believe that the public interest in disclosure
outweighed identifiable national security harms.192
Of course, there is nothing magical about any given standard or
proposal. Understanding this fact may, indeed, be a key ingredient
in making robust leaker protections feasible. The relevant constitutional text and history simply do not give us precise instructions on
how to handle leaker prosecutions or tell us what doctrinal standards courts should apply.193 What they do give us are indicia of the
principles and purposes underlying the relevant constitutional
clauses.194 Because we are not constitutionally obligated to adopt
particular standards or rules, there is considerable flexibility to
formulate and adjust the same to achieve the relevant constitutional
goals, informed by historical experience and practical considerations.
The next Subpart considers some factors that courts might look
to, case-by-case, to help them apply the standards just suggested.
Again, what is important is not the particulars of given standards
or implementing guidelines, but rather that leaker incentives are
calibrated properly in light of the relevant constitutional factors.
D. Fine-Tuning and Applying the Standards in the Courts
Taking Part V.C’s proposed standards as a given, then, we can
consider factors and points of guidance to which courts might look
to help them apply the same. This Subpart is divided into two
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
Id. at 441.
Id.
See supra Part II.C.1.
See supra Part II.C.1.
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sections: one discussing factors potentially relevant to the national
security side of the balance and one citing factors potentially relevant to the public interest question. Needless to say, this discussion
cannot come close to exhausting the list of factors potentially
relevant to each side of the balance, and it is far from comprehensive. It is meant only to provide examples of factors or points of
guidance likely to be relevant in many cases, and to illustrate how
courts might feasibly make use of the same.
1. Points of Potential Guidance on the National Security Side of
the Balance
a. Proper or Improper Classification
One means through which courts might channel the national
security inquiry is by permitting defendants to argue that they had
a reasonable basis to believe that the material that they disclosed
was improperly classified.195 Indeed, although the prosecution of
Thomas Drake ended a few days before the scheduled trial with a
plea bargain in June 2011, had it gone forward the defense was prepared to introduce testimony to that effect.196 J. William Leonard,
who had served as “Classification Czar” during the administration
of George W. Bush, had been scheduled to appear at Drake’s trial,
without pay, as a witness for Drake’s defense.197 Leonard was
prepared to testify that the classified information at issue posed no
national security threat and should never have been classified in the
first place.198 Based on pretrial discussions between the court and
195. Patricia L. Bellia, WikiLeaks and the Institutional Framework for National Security
Disclosures, 121 YALE L.J. 1448, 1523 (2012) (explaining that courts have not interpreted
existing statutes to permit such a defense, and suggesting a limited statutory defense of
improper classification through an amendment to the Espionage Act); see also Pozen, supra
note 9, at 582 n.329 (“The leak laws could pose a limited threat to the classification system
if alleged violators were allowed to raise a defense of improper classification.”).
196. Scott Shane, Complaint Seeks Punishment for Classification of Documents, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2011, at A16.
197. J. William Leonard, Op. Ed., When Secrecy Gets out of Hand, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 10,
2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/10/opinion/la-oe-leonard-classified-information20110810 [http://perma.cc/9HCG-RXGP].
198. See Transcript of Motions Hearing at 123-24, United States v. Drake, 818 F. Supp. 2d
909 (D. Md. 2011) (No. RDB-10-181) (on file with author); Steven Aftergood, Former Secrecy
Czar Asks Court to Release NSA Document, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS (May 23, 2012), http://
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the parties’ attorneys, it appears likely that the court would have
limited the scope of Leonard’s testimony or the purposes for which
the jury could consider it to a realm narrower than that suggested
by this Article’s proposed standards.199 Nonetheless, both the court
and the government appeared to take the view, reflected in those
discussions, that it is feasible for a defense expert to explain to a
jury, and for the jury to consider the expert’s view, that information
was improperly classified.200
Currently, there are three levels of classification: top secret,
secret, and confidential. The lowest level, “confidential,” applies to
“information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could
be expected to cause damage to the national security that the
original classification authority is able to identify or describe.”201 If
a defendant establishes to a court’s satisfaction that even this
relatively permissive level of classification is not met, this point
should be virtually decisive on the question of national security
harm.202 Conversely, the government may rebut the defendant’s
claim to effectively demonstrate that the information is properly
labeled “secret” or “top secret.” Although neither label in itself
should be decisive, the facts necessary to prove that one or both are
accurate, meaning that the information’s disclosure “reasonably
could be expected to cause” identified or described damage either
“serious,” for “secret” information, or “exceptionally grave,” for “top
secret” information, would be very helpful to the government with
respect to the national security side of the balance.203

fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2012/05/drake_leonard [http://perma.cc/53A2-QUE2]; Leonard, supra
note 197; Shane, supra note 196.
199. Although not entirely clear from the pretrial hearing transcripts or papers, one
possibility is that the defense might have been allowed to present Leonard’s testimony only
to bolster their argument that any classified documents that Leonard did retain without
authorization were retained by mistake, as Leonard did not realize, and had good reason not
to know, that they were classified. Transcript of Motions Hearing, supra note 198, at 119-21.
On the other hand, the defense also indicated that Leonard’s testimony was intended in part
to rebut government claims that classification status necessarily is decisive as to the danger
posed by information’s release. Id. at 122-24.
200. Id. at 119-20.
201. Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.2(a)(3), 3 C.F.R. 298 (2010).
202. See id. § 1.2(c).
203. See id. § 1.2(a)(1)-(2).
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b. How and to Whom the Information is Disclosed
Courts should look not only to the nature of what was disclosed,
but the circumstances in which it was disclosed. These circumstances include how and to whom the information was conveyed. For
example, even information that clearly complies with the highest
classification standards nonetheless may be disclosed in a manner
so careful as to substantially mitigate national security concerns. A
classic such scenario is one in which a leaker discloses a large set of
information to a journalist so that the journalist can view all of the
relevant documents in context. The leaker may do so despite
knowing or having reason to believe that it would be dangerous for
the journalist to disclose some of the information in the set. In such
a case, certain factors may support the leaker’s arguments that,
despite the dangerous bits of information, she had little objective
basis to believe that her action would harm national security.
One important factor relates to the leaker’s care in selecting the
journalist and delivering the information to her. Delivering the leak
through insecure channels, for example, might amount to a reasonable basis to fear national security harm. On the other hand, taking
steps to ensure that the materials were delivered solely to the
chosen journalist would work in the leaker’s favor, at least where
there is reason for the leaker to believe that the journalist herself
will take great care in extracting dangerous information before publication. With respect to the choice of journalist, the journalist’s
track record could be of importance. A court might ask, for example,
whether the journalist has a reputation for publishing dangerous
information indiscriminately, or whether the journalist instead is
known to redact potentially dangerous or superfluous national security information. Courts should also consider the care with which
the leaker acted in working with the journalist or offering them
guidance with respect to potentially dangerous information.
Two recent examples are instructive here. The first involves
Edward Snowden. Snowden, according to reports by journalist
Glenn Greenwald, worked extremely closely with Greenwald and
fellow journalist Laura Poitras to sift through the information that
he provided to them.204 According to Greenwald, Snowden organized
204. GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE U.S.
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and indexed the information by topic and insisted that particular
pieces of information be redacted.205 He also used sophisticated cryptographic methods to avoid surveillance by any governments, both
domestic and foreign.206 Of course, representations by Greenwald,
Poitras, or Snowden are no more conclusive as to the truth of what
took place or the broader factual context than are government
assertions to the contrary. Such statements do, however, concern
facts that are very relevant to determining whether Snowden’s disclosures are constitutionally protected. They should be argued and
resolved in litigation over leak prosecutions.
The second example involves Chelsea (formerly Bradley) Manning. Among the points disputed at Manning’s court martial was
whether her disclosures were made recklessly or with care to protect
sensitive national security information.207 The prosecution argued
that Manning leaked so many documents—roughly 700,000—that
“there is no way he even knew what he was giving WikiLeaks.”208
Prosecutors also deemed Manning’s decision to send her documents
to WikiLeaks, rather than to an established journalistic organization, reckless.209 In his closing statement at Manning’s court
martial, prosecutor Major Ashden Fein referred to the staff of
WikiLeaks as “essentially information anarchists.”210 Manning used
WikiLeaks as a “platform,” said Fein, to “ensure that all of the
information was available to the world, including the enemies of the
United States.”211 Contrary to these characterizations, Manning’s
attorney David Coombs portrayed Manning as having acted with
care and deliberativeness. Coombs emphasized that the 700,000
documents leaked by Manning were a small subset of the “hundreds
of millions of documents” to which she had access “as an all-source
analyst,” and that Manning leaked only those that she believed
were in the public interest and would not cause harm.212 Further
SURVEILLANCE STATE 51-53 (2014).
205. See id. at 29-31, 90-92.
206. Id. at 7-10.
207. Charlie Savage, In Closing Argument, Prosecutor Casts Manning as “Anarchist” for
Leaking Archives, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2013, at A14.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Charlie Savage, Trial Portrays Two Sides of Private in Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES, June
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more, contrast the prosecution’s argument that sharing the information with WikiLeaks was akin to “dump[ing it] onto the Internet,
into the hands of the enemy,”213 Coombs deemed WikiLeaks a “journalistic organization” that Manning reasonably believed would
handle the information responsibly.214
Professor Benkler testified to similar effect about WikiLeaks on
behalf of the defense at Manning’s court martial:
[B]oth the public perception of WikiLeaks at the time of the leak
and WikiLeaks’s ex-post alliance with traditional newspapers to
redact and release the materials supported a finding that
WikiLeaks was a channel that a reasonable leaker in early 2010
would see as an outlet able to mitigate the harms.215

Just as with the Snowden disclosures, matters such as how and
to whom Manning disclosed the documents are quite relevant and
helpful for courts in applying the applicable standards. Indeed, the
judge in Manning’s court martial did deem such facts and competing
characterizations relevant to the case.216 She allowed them to be
raised partly for purposes of sentencing, but also with respect to
Manning’s guilt or innocence. On the question of guilt or innocence,
she deemed the issues to bear on whether “a reasonable person
would ... have reason to believe that the leaked material would
harm the United States.”217 As we have seen, this question is a statutory factor under the Espionage Act.218
Although that factor is insufficiently protective in this Article’s
view, it nonetheless poses a question of like kind as the national
security question suggested in this Article’s proposed standards. As
the Manning trial demonstrates, courts are capable of probing
4, 2013, at A10 [hereinafter Savage, Trial Portrays Two Sides]. Similarly, Coombs pointed out
that “if Private Manning had not been selective and seeking to avoid harm, he would have
leaked much more—like reports from confidential sources.” Charlie Savage, Defense Calls
Manning’s Intentions Good, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2013, at A12 [hereinafter Savage, Defense
Calls].
213. Savage, Trial Portrays Two Sides, supra note 212.
214. Savage, Defense Calls, supra note 212.
215. Benkler, supra note 12, at 306-07.
216. Scott Shane, For Resourceful Lawyer, Setback in Soldier’s Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,
2013, at A16.
217. See Shane, supra note 216.
218. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
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questions of this nature—that is, questions asking whether one had
an objective basis to fear national security harm—in part by
assessing to whom and how materials were leaked.219
c. Whether and How Widely the Information Already Is
Known
Courts also should consider arguments by defendants to the effect
that the same aspects of the leaked information that the government deems dangerous were already widely known, or known by
whatever persons the government seeks to prevent from knowing
them. In a different context, specifically that of cases in which the
government itself resists disclosing information to the courts under
the state secrets doctrine or to individual requesters under the
Freedom of Information Act, courts tend to be highly deferential to
government claims that information, even if widely known, technically remains closely held because it has yet to be officially confirmed by the government.220
Yet the leaks context is materially different and should be treated
as such. In the leaks context, the government is not being asked to
officially confirm the leaked information. To the contrary, the government is prosecuting precisely on the basis that the leak was
unofficial. Because the question of national security harm should be
a crucial one in the prosecution context, it may be quite relevant to
a leaker’s defense that the unofficially leaked information had
already been made known, whether through official or unofficial
channels, to the relevant persons. Given such existing knowledge,
the leaker might reasonably have concluded that the information
was harmless, as existing knowledge of the same had no effect.
Alternatively, the leaker might have had no basis to believe that the
leak would cause harms beyond any already caused.
Such a defense seems unlikely to arise in a context in which the
only information conveyed was the information already known. In
such a case, it is hard to see what the point of leaking would have
been, and indeed such a leaker would have a difficult case to make
219. See Savage, Defense Calls, supra note 212.
220. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 535-38 (S.D.N.Y.
2013); KITROSSER, supra note 94, at 105-06.
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on the public interest side of the balance. Rather, such a defense
might arise in a context in which the relevant information is leaked,
either intentionally or inadvertently, as part of a larger discussion.
A hypothetical scenario comes to mind based only very loosely on
the facts underlying John Kiriakou’s recent prosecution for leaking
the names of CIA officers to reporters.221 Suppose that a source
discussed the CIA’s post-9/11 involvement in waterboarding with a
journalist in the days before the program was publicly known and
officially acknowledged. Suppose further that in the course of those
discussions, the source mentioned the names of CIA officers whose
identities, though officially secret, already were widely known. In
such a case, the fact that the names already were known, assuming
that the source himself was aware the names were known, should
be a factor helpful to the leaker’s case that he lacked an objective
basis to believe that the disclosure would be dangerous.222
2. Points of Potential Guidance on the Public Interest Side of the
Balance
On the public interest side of the balance, any number of factors
might serve as potential points of guidance for courts applying the
standards that this Article suggests. This Section explores three
such factors.
a. Reasonable Arguments Could Be Made to the Effect that
Unknown Programs Were Illegal
At least one mixed approach proponent argues that leakers
should be exempt from prosecution or other punishment for
revealing illegal government activities.223 Although leakers should
have at least this level of protection, by itself it is far from adequate.
This is so for two reasons. First, much information of public
221. See Steve Coll, The Spy Who Said Too Much, NEW YORKER, Apr. 1, 2013, at 54
(chronicling the leak case of John Kiriakou, who was prosecuted for revealing CIA officers’
names and whose supporters claim he was singled out for prosecution due to earlier
interviews in which he claimed that the CIA had engaged in waterboarding).
222. Id.
223. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press, 1 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 185, 195 (2007).
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interest—a category that surely includes a great deal of classified
information—does not necessarily involve illegal government
activities. Second, it rarely, if ever, happens that the executive
branch flatly concedes a program’s illegality. To the contrary, it is
entirely predictable that administrations will often, if not always,
claim that any statutes that they are accused of violating must be
construed to permit their conduct to avoid running afoul of Article
II’s grant of executive power to the President.224
What should weigh very heavily in favor of leakers on the public
interest side of the balance is that a leak reveals a program or other
activity, the legality of which is subject to reasonable debate. The
years since 9/11 are filled with examples of leaks revealing programs that had been justified in secret on legal grounds most
charitably described as debatable. A now-classic set of examples are
leaks revealing programs—including warrantless wiretapping and
“enhanced interrogations”—that had been conducted in secret in
apparent violation of existing statutes.225 The programs had been
justified by internal executive branch memoranda produced by the
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) under exceedingly insular conditions.
As Jack Goldsmith wrote of this time period, which predated his
own term as OLC head from late 2003 to mid-2004, the tiny, likeminded group entrusted to write the relevant legal opinions simply
“blew through” any statutes that they “didn’t like ... in secret based
on flimsy legal opinions they guarded closely so no one could
question the legal basis for the operations.”226 In more recent days,
among the earliest published of Edward Snowden’s disclosures were
a series of classified orders by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC) extending from 2006 through 2013.227 The FISC
224. See generally Heidi Kitrosser, National Security and the Article II Shell Game, 26
CONST. COMMENT. 483 (2010) (describing the growing ubiquity of such Article II-based
arguments).
225. Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Memos Spell Out Brutal C.I.A. Mode of Interrogation,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2009, at A1.
226. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 181 (2007).
227. See GREENWALD, supra note 204, at 27-29, 70-71; Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata
Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 75960 (2014); Katherine Jacobsen & Elizabeth Barber, NSA Revelations: A Timeline of What’s
Come Out Since Snowden Leaks Began, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 5, 2013),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2013/1016/NSA-revelations-A-timeline-of-what-s-come-outsince-Snowden-leaks-began/June-5-8-2013 [http://perma.cc/T8DN-ZA2R].

2015]

LEAK PROSECUTIONS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

1273

operates largely in secret, hearing warrant applications brought ex
parte by the government and issuing classified orders.228 Since the
leaked orders’ publication, a number of legal experts have sharply
critiqued their statutory and constitutional soundness.229 Additionally, critics have argued that the orders reflect a troubling expansion of the limited role that FISC was meant to serve. As Laura
Donohue writes, “Congress did not envision a lawmaking role for
FISC. Its decisions were not to serve as precedent, and FISC was
not to offer lengthy legal analyses, crafting in the process, for
instance, exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement or defenses of wholesale surveillance programs.”230 Yet she
concludes that FISC inhabits precisely such a role in the orders
disclosed by Snowden.231
These examples demonstrate the strong public interest in illuminating the very existence of programs so that their legality may be
evaluated. They also reveal that highly secretive legal evaluations
will often prove wanting, in no small part because they are unexposed to external critique. The examples help to bolster the
common-sense point that if exposing clearly illegal programs is
strongly in the public interest, then exposing programs, the legality
of which can reasonably be debated, is of equal public interest.
b. Whether Alternative Effective Means of Disclosure Were
Available and If so Were Exhausted
In evaluating the public interest side of the balance, courts also
should consider the existence and adequacy of any alternatives to
leaking information to the press. A strong public interest in learning
particular information may be offset if it turns out that there were
official channels through which release of the information could
have been sought. In such a case, the public interest might have
been served through means other than the leaker’s going straight
228. Donohue, supra note 227, at 793, 823.
229. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 12, at 321-22 (“[T]he telephony bulk collection program
[approved by the orders] likely violates the Fourth Amendment.”); Donohue, supra note 227,
at 803-06, 836-97 (arguing that the program approved by the orders violates statutory and
constitutional law).
230. Donohue, supra note 227, at 806.
231. Id. at 806, 822-24.
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to the press. At the same time, courts should evaluate whether the
leaker had a reasonable basis to believe that any official means
provided would be ineffective or that the leaker would suffer retaliation for using the official pathway. In so evaluating, courts ought
to consider not only “paper” protections and official leak channels,
but the executive’s, or relevant agency’s, track record in managing
these leak channels. For instance, if the public interest in a
particular leak was time-sensitive, it should matter to courts that
the official channel or channels provided to leakers is known to be
exceedingly slow. Similarly, if leakers formally are protected from
retaliation for particular types of disclosures but a history of
retaliation is known to exist, that history should factor into courts’
determinations as to whether leakers should have taken the
theoretically protected route rather than turning to the press.
The Thomas Drake case provides an instructive example of how
alternative channels might impact the weight given to the public
interest side of the balance.232 Drake, along with colleagues from the
National Security Agency (NSA), had shared his concerns that the
NSA was mishandling surveillance programs with a high-level
staffer on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and with the “congressional committees investigating intelligence
failures related to 9/11.”233 These congressional discussions ran afoul
of a requirement that NSA employees get internal approval before
contacting Congress, a rule that applies to personnel across the
intelligence community.234 Drake also had helped the Department
of Defense’s Inspector General (IG) investigate a complaint involving his concerns.235 Believing that these efforts were having little
effect, Drake eventually leaked information to a reporter from the
Baltimore Sun.236 The Baltimore Sun stories triggered an FBI

232. See Jane Mayer, The Secret Sharer, NEW YORKER, May 23, 2011, at 46-57.
233. Id. at 52.
234. Id.; see also How to File a Whistleblower Complaint, OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about-this-site/contact-the-ig/how-to-file-a-whistle
blower-complaint [http://perma.cc/X39H-XQUB] (last visited Apr. 13, 2015) (outlining current
procedures that intelligence community members must follow before approaching the House
and Senate Intelligence Committees; such procedures include first notifying and receiving
clearance from the Director of National Intelligence).
235. Mayer, supra note 232, at 54.
236. Id. at 54-55.
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investigation to locate its source.237 The FBI’s interest reportedly
was piqued because they thought that the Sun stories might share
a source with the 2005 New York Times story revealing that the
NSA was secretly engaged in warrantless wiretapping.238 FBI agents
raided the houses of all four persons who had signed the IG
Complaint with which Drake had assisted.239 “Under the law, such
complaints are confidential, and employees who file them are supposed to be protected from retaliation. It’s unclear if the Trailblazer
complaint tipped off authorities, but all four people who signed it
became targets.”240 Drake, who had not signed the Complaint, but
had assisted in its investigation, was the next to have his house
raided.241 Drake eventually was indicted more than two years after
the raid, on April 14, 2010.242
Drake’s preleak efforts add heft to the public interest side of his
case. These efforts and their aftermath suggest that extant official
channels were inadequate both on paper and in practice, and that
the IG channel in particular precipitated very serious retaliation.
Assuming that Drake’s disclosures substantively were in the public
interest, the preleak events suggest that leaking might well have
been the only way to serve that interest.
c. Extent to Which Debate or Action in Fact Were Generated
by a Leak
The public interest side of the balance also should be impacted in
a leaker’s favor by evidence to the effect that their leak generated
actual public debate or official corrective actions. A classic example
of such effects involves the leak of the Pentagon Papers. As I have
detailed elsewhere, the Papers’ leak had a dramatic effect on public
attitudes about the war in Vietnam and about national security and
government decision making in the United States more broadly.243
237. Id. at 55.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 56.
241. Id.
242. Id.; see also Indictment, United States v. Drake, 818 F. Supp. 2d 909 (D. Md. 2011)
(No. ROB 10 CR 0181).
243. See generally Heidi Kitrosser, What If Daniel Ellsberg Hadn’t Bothered?, 45 IND. L.
REV. 89 (2011).
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More recently, there is little doubt that the Snowden leaks have
generated tremendous expressions of public alarm over the revealed
information as well as a host of official responsive actions including
information releases, program reviews, policy changes and proposed
changes, litigation, and judicial rulings.244 As Benkler puts it, the
Snowden disclosures “launched the most extensive public reassessment of surveillance practices by the American security establishment since the mid-1970s.”245
Although evidence that a leak actually generated substantial
debate or change should bolster a leaker’s public interest argument,
the absence of such evidence ought not to count against the leaker.
Unlike the other national security and public interest factors mentioned in this and the previous section, the factor of actual debate
or action does not lend itself to counterpart “pro” and “con” sides.
Indeed, information could be of great public interest in the sense
that it reveals possible illegality, policies of dubious efficacy or
morality, or programs so substantial that their secrecy is presumptively illegitimate. Yet such facts may fail subjectively to interest the
public, at least in the short run, for any number of reasons not
bearing on the substantive importance of the leak.246
CONCLUSION
The spate of leak prosecutions and high-profile leak investigations of the past few years present both a challenge and an opportunity for First Amendment freedoms. The events challenge the free
flow of information about the government’s national security activities, particularly information that may conflict with administration
messaging. Yet these events also illuminate the dangers of a legal
244. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 12, at 281-82; Jacobsen & Barber, supra note 227.
245. Benkler, supra note 12, at 281.
246. For instance, Jack Goldsmith observes that in the first year or two after 9/11, the
Washington Post and other outlets published some “remarkable” stories on “top-secret
counterterrorism programs.” GOLDSMITH, supra note 129, at 63. Yet the programs revealed
in these stories, “government practices that would prove enormously controversial in a few
years, were greeted by the public with silence or a nod of approval” early on. Id. at 64. The
public’s initial lack of interest can be explained in large part as a reflection of public
reluctance to question national security initiatives in the early days after 9/11. Furthermore,
there was a certain tautology at work; it appears to have taken an accumulation of evidence,
released over time, of numerous dubious government programs for Americans to begin to gain
a real interest in such evidence. See id. at 64-67.
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system that accords the executive virtually unfettered discretion
both to classify information and to prosecute leaks of the same. Such
illumination provides an opportunity to revisit this system and its
comportment with basic First Amendment principles. It also marks
a chance to revisit the conventional wisdom that there is little
feasible alternative to unfettered executive discretion with respect
to national security leaks. Most fundamentally, it invites us to
consider anew if “national security is too important to be left to
national security insiders.”247

247. Benkler, supra note 12, at 289.

